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U.S. POLICY ON WEAPONIZING SPACE AND THE ARMY'S ROLE IN SPACE CONTROL OPERATIONS
The United States is an attractive candidate for a "Space Pearl Harbor." We are on notice, but we have not noticed.
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization 11 Jan 2001
The United States is more reliant on space capabilities than any other country in the world. 1 The United States military and intelligence communities see space as the ultimate high ground and use space capabilities for a wide range of defense and intelligence missions. The U.S. Government relies on civil space capabilities for space science, Earth observation and research, human space flight, and space technologies. 2 The commercial sector is now expanding into the domain of space to further their economic benefit. For example, everyday uses of satellites include purchases at the gas station, television broadcasts, commercial imagery, pagers and cell phone utilities. However, this reliance on space may lead to vulnerabilities where our space systems may come under attack by our adversaries. Similarly, the increased access to space may now also allow our adversaries to exploit space systems to gain a strategic or tactical advantage. The purpose of this strategy research paper is to investigate the role the Army can play to address space system threats. This paper examines national space policy, roles and missions of the services, joint and service doctrine, and Army capabilities to execute the space control mission in support of the national leadership and combatant commanders worldwide. In so doing, it recommends improvements in each of these areas to assure access to space for the United States and its allies and deny, as required, space capabilities to our adversaries.
SPACE POLICY REVIEW
The United States is currently in the unique position of being the only superpower in the world. As such, we are able to determine the extent to which we will further pursue our military capabilities to exert global influence. A vital concern for current and future national security is the use of space to further national objectives. Ultimately, the nation needs to decide whether our national space policy is to preserve space for peaceful purposes, or to operate weapon systems in space "to protect" our vital national interests. This section investigates the threat to U.S. space systems, the space threat to the U.S. by other countries, and current U.S. national space policy. It concludes with a recommendation to modify the existing language in U.S.
space policy concerning our definition of the use of space for peaceful purposes. China validates this concern by stating that, "China will continue to use commercial satellite imagery and may seek to join an international consortium-owned constellation." 7 The net effect of this proliferation of space capabilities is that our adversaries may have tremendous access to space capabilities that allow them to derive the same benefit of space force enhancement as currently in practice by the U.S. military at a much-reduced cost. Therefore, these commercial and consortia space capabilities available to our adversaries may constitute a threat, or an equalizer, as they negate the current asymmetric advantage the U.S. has over its adversaries in peace and war.
UNITED STATES RELIANCE ON SPACE

UNITED STATES SPACE POLICY
Given the overview of the potential threats to the United States access to space, a review of current U.S. Space Policy is necessary to determine which military actions we can take to enable our assured access to space. Several government documents collectively comprise the body of space policy. These documents include U.S. National Space Policy, Department of Defense (DoD) Space Policy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and Joint and Service Space Doctrine. There is no one document or unified view, but a collection of views to interpret the U.S. position on space weaponization.
U.S. National Space Policy outlines broad goals and breaks up guidance into the following areas: civil, national security, commercial and intersector space guidelines. From the strategic perspective, the policy indicates that we will maintain a, "balanced national space program that serves our goals in national security, foreign policy, economic growth, environmental stewardship and scientific and technical excellence." 8 It further states, "The United States will pursue greater levels of partnership and cooperation in national and international space activities and work with other nations to ensure the continued exploration and use of space for peaceful purposes." 9 The statement that opens the door for the eventual weaponizing of space follows where the policy indicates, ""peaceful purposes" allow defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national security and other goals." 10 In the area of National Security
Guidelines, there are specific tasks that state what the U.S. will do to secure national security objectives. Specifically, it claims, "National security space activities shall contribute to U.S.
National security by:
a. providing support for the United States' inherent right of self-defense and our defense commitments to allies and friends;
b. deterring, warning, and if necessary, defending against enemy attack;
c. assuring that hostile forces cannot prevent our own use of space;
d. countering, if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile purposes."
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There is additional specific defense sector guidance within the National Security Guidelines. It states, "The DoD shall maintain the capability to execute the mission areas of space support, force enhancement, space control, and force application" 12 (italics added). These last two mission areas (space control and force application) demand further examination because they point to the issue of space weapons that may need to deploy in space, resulting in the weaponizing of space.
The National Space Policy states, "Consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries." 13 Space control is defined as those activities that provide freedom of action in space for friendly forces while, when directed, denying the same to an adversary. Space control includes four mission areas including space surveillance, protection, prevention, and negation. The negation area of space control is that mission that specifically addresses the means to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy an adversary's space capability. 14 In the space control portion of the U.S. Space
Command Long Range Plan, it states, "the Space-Based Jammers and Space-Based Lasers appear the most versatile in providing options for temporary effects on anticipated targets." Again turning to the USSPACECOM Long Range Plan, under discussions of space force application, it list a variety of space-based platforms for BMD to include space-based radar and space-based laser systems. 18 The combination of documents described here seem to provide clear indication of U.S. intentions to place portions of the BMD system "in space".
EXTERNAL FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
Given the nature of U.S. vital national interests in space, the potential for an adversary to attack our assets, and a space policy that would allow room for liberal interpretation to put weapons in space, it is prudent to survey the potential limitations to U.S. freedom of action in space. In addition to international opinion, there is a body of international space policy, primarily would become irrelevant if an ABM system could "protect" a nation. The ABM Treaty is very specific in its limitation on the number of missiles and launchers a country could employ and in its description of the elements of an ABM system to include missiles, launchers, and radars.
The specific wording of the ABM Treaty pertaining to this debate is found in Article V which 
OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES
Given the threats to U.S. space systems, U.S. Space Policy, and external influences, the question remains whether to deploy weapon systems on orbit or not. The heart of this debate now lies with the United States and is simply a question of how far we will go in putting "defense" systems in orbit to advance our national interests. As stated above, the U.S. Space
Policy clearly articulates that although we are committed to the use of space for peaceful purposes, we define peaceful purposes to allow defense activities to pursue national security goals. 24 Today, we have many defense related satellite systems in orbit to include national technical means of acquiring satellite imagery for imagery intelligence (IMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), infra-red detection systems to provide early warning of missile launches, numerous satellite communications systems for U.S. Government and DoD activities, and the GPS system for position, navigation, velocity, and timing enhancements to DoD forces. Thus far, one could characterize the overall deployment of DoD systems on orbit as defensive, or informational in nature. Although plans were developed in the 1960's to do so, the U.S. has yet to place the first offensive system in orbit to fire a kinetic weapon, directed energy weapon, or Radio Frequency (RF) Jammer. Therefore, it seems the debate boils down to two courses of action:
• Option A: Maintain the status quo and do not deploy weapon systems to orbit.
Continue the development of space-based force enhancement and information systems while developing ground-based space control negation systems.
• Option B: Deploy space control and ABM weapon systems to orbit and retain the right to further weaponize space, as required, to meet national security objectives.
ANALYSIS
This decades old debate began with the space race between the U.S. and the USSR.
The increased reliance on space by the U.S. military and intelligence community keeps the debate alive and fresh. One must ask whether the conditions have changed so significantly over the last forty years that it would cause the United States to employ a new concept of operations for space. There are two criteria useful in examining the courses of action outlined above. The first is the ability to meet the goals outlined in the national space policy. The second is to avoid a "Space Pearl Harbor". Course of action (a) allows the continued use of space for peaceful purposes while still militarizing space to provide the defense and intelligencerelated activities in space. Increased awareness of the threat and the ability to monitor activities and intentions are the way to avoid surprise. Course of action (b) may also accomplish the U.S. national security mission, but generates greater risk. One goal of the U.S. Space policy is to promote international cooperation. The weaponizing of space may lead to greater tension and distrust between the US and potential adversaries. As you recall, the Japanese did not capture Pearl Harbor because a lack of forward military presence. They simply attacked the military force the U.S. had stationed in the Pacific. Militarizing space with weapon systems may give our adversaries more incentive to attack our space-based systems than to also preserve space for "peaceful purposes".
ROLES OF THE SERVICES
If we assume the status quo on space policy and are then limited to developing terrestrialbased space control capabilities, the services need to understand their respective portion of the mission and be responsive to the combatant commanders to provide the requisite capabilities. 
JOINT AND ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPACE FORCES
Assuming continued multi-service participation in space operations, the final item that bears scrutiny is the joint integration of service space capabilities in support of the combatant Space operations personnel at all levels were unclear about who had the authority to prioritize and deconflict space effects in theater. and environmental monitoring. Bottom-line is the ARSST will be the local subject matter expert on all systems and missions if the support comes from a space system.
The result of the space authority being in the CAOC with an Air Force only staff was a limited view of the overall space support to the theater. In fact, the space authority never had the means to receive reports from all service space elements and did not track the operational status of all space forces in theater. Additionally, the late arrival in theater of the space authority precluded his active participation in the planning process of theater operations. The delayed designation of the space authority and the lack of a "joint" space staff comprised of space expertise from all services led to a lack of coordination, deconfliction, integration and synchronization of space operations in the CENTCOM Theater.
RECOMMENDATIONS
SPACE POLICY
I recommend the United States pursue Option A from the space policy discussion above, and limit the militarization of space to defensive and intelligence applications only. Although we are the lone superpower today, we not only have the power to advance our cause as a global hegemon, but we also have the responsibility to lead the global community in a responsible manner. The fact that we have the technological capability to weaponize space for U.S.
national security purposes does not mandate that we forego the conventions of international norms to advance our own cause. The withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may be justified by virtue of the fact that the USSR no longer exists and the nuclear arms race was squelched in our winning the Cold War. The current ballistic missile threat may warrant the placement of certain ABM capabilities in space such as detection and tracking capability to enhance ABM system performance. This would be consistent with U.S. previous deployments of space systems in orbit, short of an actual offensive weapon system.
We have witnessed in recent days the advancement of space capabilities by the PRC. 
CONCLUSION
The United States is the greatest power in the world today. We exploit the domain of space for military, civil, and commercial purposes -all in support of national security objectives.
Although we do incur some vulnerability due to our heavy reliance on space capabilities, our national space policy provides us the authority to defend our space assets, as required. In contemplating the best way to defend our assets in orbit, we debate the need to place offensive weapons in space to protect ourselves. It is recommended that we maintain our leadership in the world as a peaceful nation and preserve space for peaceful purposes. The placement of weapons in space may unnecessarily lead to increased competition in space and a future space war. By effectively articulating roles and missions to the services, we can develop terrestrially based weapons to adequately protect our assets and defeat adversary capabilities in space. It is recommended that the SECDEF provide better fidelity to the space control mission by designating the Army as lead service for ground-based, Navy for sea-based, and Air Force for air and space based space control capabilities. Lastly, the most effective use of all service space operations capabilities is through a joint space authority. To fully integrate and deconflict missions and requirements, staff officers from every service must adequately staff the space authority with joint space personnel.
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